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PARENTAL RIGHTS: EDUCATIONAL ALTERNATIVES
AND CURRICULUM CONTROL
The vital function of education in a democratic society makes the
choice of a child's educational alternatives a crucial decision.' Education
has become predominantly a state function because the learning experi-
ence in school is a paramount concern of modern society. 2 This state inter-
est, and the resultant state power to compel education,3 often conflicts
with the parents' right to choose the schooling for their children. Rather
than ruling that one interest is paramount, the United States Supreme
Court has chosen to balance these interests.' As a result of this compro-
mise, there are no clear guidelines establishing the degree to which the
state may regulate education without infringing upon the rights of the
parents.5
The constitutional basis of the parental right to choose the schooling
for one's child has never been satisfactorily identified.' At common law,
See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). In discussing the import-
ance of education in an advanced society the Brown court stated:
Today [education] is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education.
2 See generally J. CONANT, THE CHILD, THE PARENT AND THE STATE 15-17 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as CoNANer]; Note, Freedom and Public Education: The Need for New
Standards, 50 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 530, 531-32 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Freedom and Public
Education]. Demands of World War II for improved education raised public consciousness
of the need for youth with more sophisticated training than had been provided previously by
public education. Prior to this development judicial skepticism about government interfer-
ence with rights of citizens had waned and the courts were willing to accept expansion of the
required curriculum in public schools. See, e.g., Alexander v. Phillips, 31 Ariz. 503, -, 254
P. 1056, 1059 (1927) (ultimate purpose of public schools is matter of reasonable discretion of
school authorities). After the decline of the substantive due process doctrine, see notes 35-36
infra, the courts ceased to explore whether compulsory courses performed a proper educa-
tional function. See Hirschoff, Parents and the Public School Curriculum: Is There a Right
to Have One's Child Excused From Objectionable Instruction, 50 S. CAL. L. Rxv. 871, 890-93
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Public School Curriculum]; Goldstein, Reflections on Develop-
ing Trends in the Law of Student Rights, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 612, 612-13 (1970).
See text accompanying notes 14-19 infra.
'D. KimP, M. YuDORF, EDUCATIONAL POLCY AND THE LAW 6-8 (1974).
5 L. PETERSON, R. ROSSMILLER & M. VoLZ, THE LAW AND PUBLIC SCHOOL OPERATION 389
(1969).
1 See text accompanying notes 20-28 infra.
Although children are "persons" within the meaning of the Bill of Rights, see Haley v.
Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599, 601 (1948), and have been extended the protection of the fourteenth
amendment, In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967), they do not enjoy the right to control their
own education. Thus, despite the fact that the procedural safeguards of the fifth amendment
are applicable to children, In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364-65, 368 (1970) and that students
are entitled to the first amendment rights of freedom of speech, Tinker v. Des Moines Inde-
pendent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969), and free exercise of religion, see
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218-19 (1972), most education cases focus on the rights of
the parents. See generally 406 U.S. at 241-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
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the parents' authority over the education of their children was a natural
right arising out of the familial prerogatives of custody, care and nurture
of offspring. 7 The parents were entitled to have their children taught
where, when, how, what and by whom they judged best able to fulfill the
child's interest in a quality education.' The recognition of a fundamental
community interest in a child's education later tempered the parental
control over the child.9 Within the limits imposed by society's need for
training "good citizens," parents retained the natural right to control the
rearing and education of their children.
As a consequence of the increasing complexity of the process of sociali-
zation, the family gradually has been relieved of its educational function."'
The exercise of contemporary parental right usually is limited to the par-
ents' choice of public or non-public educational institutions or home in-
struction. This choice is often made between different value systems"
which are established through the curriculum 2 offered by each alternative
The "educational trinity" involves the interests of the state, the parents and the child.
However, confrontation in the courts has resulted from the clash between the rights of the
parents and the rights of the state. The argument that the child should have a voice has been
derived from the court practices in custody and neglect proceedings. Knudson, The Educa-
tion of the Amish Child, 62 CALIF. L. Rev. 1506 (1974). See generally Forer, Rights of Children:
A Legal Vacuum, 55 A.B.A. J. 1151 (1969). In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the
Court refused to call into question the traditional concepts of parental control over the
children's educational preference despite Justice Douglas' contention that the children's
wishes should be considered. 406 U.S. at 231. The courts are not likely to allow the minor
the right to make a value judgment which traditionally has been made by the family. See
Doe v. Irwin, 441 F. Supp. 1247, 1249-50, 1253-55 (W. D. Mich. 1977).
' See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 450-53 (1809). At common law parents had abso-
lute authority over the education of their child. As society developed, parents delegated part
of this authority to tutors or schoolmasters who stood in loco parentis to the child. The tutor's
authority was commensurate with the parental power committed to his charge. Id. at 452. In
a society based upon feudal concepts, the child represented "paternal chattel" owing services
to his father. Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce,
21 SYRACUSE L. REv. 55, 56 (1970).
People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, _ 255 P. 610, 613 (1927).
The state for its own protection can require children to be educated. Consequently,
certain studies plainly essential to "good citizenship" must be taught even if contrary to the
wishes of the parents. The parents, however, had the right to refuse to send their children to
classes not essential to "good citizenship." People ex rel Vollmar v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276,
. 255 P. 610, 613 (1927). In Stanley, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that Bible
teaching was not essential to good citizenship, enabling the child to withdraw from required
readings of the Bible. Id. at _, 255 P. at 614. The courts warned that state authority
must be tempered with due regard for the desires and interests of the parents because the
teacher only had a temporary interest in the welfare of the child. State ex rel. Kelley v.
Ferguson, 95 Neb. 63, - 144 N.W. 1039, 1042 (1914) (parental choice not to have child
taught domestic science); accord, Hardwick v. Board of School Trustees, 54 Cal. App. 696,
_ 205 P. 49, 54 (1921) (exemption from dance in physical education class).
0. BANKS, THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 66 (1968) [hereinafter cited as BANKs]; see
J. HOGAN, THE SCHOOLS, THE COURTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 1 (1974).
" See, e.g., School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 242 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (required reading of the Bible in public schools declared unconstitutional).
" As used herein "curriculum" refers to the courses of study, subjects, classes and organ-
ized group activities provided by a school. E.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51013 (West 1978).
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mode of education. While the academic policies of the public schools
usually reflect community consensus, the policies of private educational
efforts often reflect the particular ideological or philosophical views of the
founders, trustees, administrators, faculties or, in the case of home instruc-
tion, the parents.'3 This choice, however, is not unfettered. The state's
interest in education justifies a reasonable assertion of its authority to
protect the child's welfare. 4 The state as parens patriae 5 acts to guard the
"general interest in the youth's well-being," and to secure the needs of
society in a responsible citizenry.'" Although the state's role in the educa-
tional process may be viewed by parents as an usurpation of parental
dignity and rights," "education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local government.""8 Although the family still shares in the so-
cialization process, 9 the legal rights necessary to protect this role have not
been sufficient to impede state encroachment.
Although the right of parents to control their childrens' upbringing is
well-established, the Supreme Court has not declared the parents' right to
"Course of study" means the planned content of a series of classes, courses, subjects, studies,
or related activities. E.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51014 (West 1978).
13 Developments in the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1045, 1054-55 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Academic Freedom].
" See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). The state fulfills its role as
guardian of the community by safeguarding the child from parental abuses and by protecting
the child's educational opportunities for growth into a "free and independent" citizen. Id. at
165. In Prince, the defendant claimed that the rightful exercise of her religious convictions,
as well as her parental rights, entitled her to direct her child to sell religious magazines in
contravention of the Massachusetts child labor laws. The Supreme Court upheld the statute's
enforcement. The Court stated that Meyer v. Nebraska, 261 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), had recognized a private realm of the family beyond
state regulation. 321 U.S. at 166. State authority, however, is not automatically nullified by
a parent's claim of religious or parental rights. The state is entitled to act to protect the
community interests. Id.
11 The doctrine of parens patriae refers to the state's sovereign power of special protection
and control over persons without legal capability, such as minor children. E.g., McIntosh v.
Dill, 86 Okla. 1, _ 205 P. 917, 925 (1922). The state has the constitutional power to protect
the child's well-being for state interests and to aid the discharge of parental responsibilities.
See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
11 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944). The state interest in a system of
compulsory education traditionally has been advanced in terms suggested by the Prince
decision. For example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the state argued that
effective and intelligent participation in a democratic political system requires some degree
of education for its citizens. Further, education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and
economically self-sufficient participants in society. 406 U.S. at 221.
17 In recent years, the establishment of health and sex education courses in the public
schools typifies to some parents the erosion of their role in guiding the upbringing of their
children. Since these subjects were once solely within the province of personal family relation-
ships, the intrusion has been acutely felt by some parents. See Valent v. Board of Educ., 114
N. J. Super. 63, 76, 274 A.2d 832, 839 (1971) (validity of sex education program); see, e.g.,
Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo County Bd. of Educ., 51 Cal. App.3d 1, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 68 (1975).
1S Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). See Reutter, The Law and The
Curriculum, 20 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 91, 91 (1955).
11 See BANKS, supra note 10, at 2-3.
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guide the education of their children to be a fundamental right. The princi-
pal contemporary challenges to school laws and regulations are grounded
instead upon a claim of violation of a parent's civil rights."0 Although
parents have ceased to frame their claims solely in terms of natural rights,
the Supreme Court has attempted to establish a constitutional basis for
protecting such parental interests.2 ' The Court has acknowledged that the
penumbral right of privacy may implicitly encompass these parental pre-
rogatives." Accordingly, in Runyon v. McCrary," the most recent Supreme
Court decision in this area, the Court suggested that separate claims of
parental and privacy rights may be variations of a single constitutional
right. 4 Despite this characterization, the Court stated that the exercise of
familial rights in determining the nature of the child's education did not
preclude reasonable government regulation.2 Thus, the Runyon Court's
21 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207-09 (1972) (freedom of religion); Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504-06 (1969) (freedom
of speech); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103 (1968) (establishment of religion); see
Freedom and Public Education, supra note 2, at 533.
23 In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534 (1925), the Supreme Court extended constitutional protection to parents' natu-
ral rights under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See text accompanying
notes 29-37 infra. Subsequent to the application of first amendment liberties through the
fourteenth amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), parents have
ceased basing their claims of authority over their minor children solely upon natural rights.
Various decisions reveal the Court's inability to agree on a constitutional principle encom-
passing natural rights. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245-47 (1968) (free
exercise of religion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U-S. 479, 482-83 (1965) (first amendment
right of freedom of speech); School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 248 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (due process clause of fourteenth amendment).
2 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965). The Supreme Court in
Griswold noted the absence of any constitutional provisions related to the right to educate
the child in a school of the parents' choice, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925),
or the right to study any particular subject or any foreign language, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923). The Court nevertheless construed the first amendment to include these
penumbral rights. 381 U.S. at 482-83. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe the Court
declared that the Constitution protected the personal right to privacy. The guarantee of
personal privacy extends into activities linked with the family relationship, such as child-
rearing and education. Id. at 153, citing Meyer and Pierce. The state, however, may limit
these guarantees only if the regulation can be justified by a "compelling state interest." Id.
at 155. See generally Note, Runyon v. McCrary: Section 1981 Opens the Doors of Discrimina-
tory Private Schools, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 179, 194-96 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Runyon
v. McCrary: Section 1981].
427 U.S. 160 (1976).
24 Id. at 178 n.15. In Runyon the Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibited
private, commercially operated non-sectarian schools from practicing discrimination in their
admissions programs. The application of section 1981 did not violate the parents' right to
direct the education of their children nor the right of free association. Id. at 175-79. See
generally Runyon v. McCrary: Section 1981, supra note 22.
11 427 U.S. at 178. The Court noted that reasonable regulation would not prevent the
schools from imparting whatever values and standards they deemed desirable. Id. at 177. This
right of the parents and the schools, however, will be effective only if the regulation of school
conduct does not affect their ability to inculcate such values and standards. Hirschoff,
Runyon v. McCrary and Regulation of Private Schools, 52 IND. L.J. 747, 751 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Private Schools]; see text accompanying notes 62-68 infra.
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reaffirmation of earlier decisions which acknowledged the state's power to
regulate education"5 does not clarify the constitutional status of parental
rights. Nevertheless, the trend of recent decisions indicates that education
now might be viewed as a reciprocal arrangement between the individual
and the state focusing on considerations of political literacy and economic
self-sufficiencyY When the courts are called upon to determine the bound-
aries between state and parental interests, however, the Runyon decision
implicitly leads them to rely on the meanings given these terms by state
educational legislation and policies.28
State courts' review of educational legislation and regulation has been
influenced by earlier Supreme Court decisions involving educational inter-
ests. The Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska29 declared that the parental
privileges recognized at common law were protected by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.2 Based upon the doctrine of substan-
tive due process, 31 the Court concluded that a state law prohibiting the
teaching of German abridged the parent's right t6 control his children.32
In Meyer, and in subsequent cases involving educational interests,33 the
Court considered whether the regulations were so irrational as to be arbi-
trary, and, thus, a deprivation of the parents' interest in the right to direct
the upbringing of their children. 31 If the parents' interest was unreasonably
" Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
1 Project: Education and the Law: State Interests and Individual Rights, 74 MmIH. L.
REv. 1373, 1401 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Education and the Law]. Although the Supreme
Court in San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), did not hold the right
to receive an education to be a fundamental right, id. at 30, 35, many states declare that
education is a protected right. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 133, 147, 351 A.2d 713,
720 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1976); Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash.
2d 476, 512-13, 585 P.2d 71, 92 (1978). Since Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944),
the articulated function of education has been to foster a political and economic growth of
the individual. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
" Education and the Law, supra note 27, at 1403.
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
" The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part, "nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.. ." U.S. CONST., amend.
XIV.
" See text accompanying notes 33-37 infra.
u" 262 U.S. at 401. In accordance with then existing doctrine, the parents and the teacher
in Meyer asked for protection against unlawful interference with their property rights in
conducting business. These rights were part of the "liberty" protected by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Although the Supreme Court's reasoning focused upon
the burden on the teacher's right to teach as an occupation, the Court acknowledged the
protected liberty of the parents to direct the upbringing and education of their children. Id.
at 399-400.
3 Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927) (regulation of private foreign language
schools and teachers declared unconstitutional); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (Oregon compulsory public school attendance statute declared unconstitutional); see
text accompanying notes 62-71 infra.
3 262 U.S. at 400. The Meyer Court declared that "[t]he established doctrine is that
this liberty may not be interferred with, under the guise of protecting the public interest, by
legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within
19791
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interfered with by the state, the legislation is an unconstitutional govern-
mental intrusion upon the parents' rights.s5 Since the concept of substan-
tive due process implicitly acknowledges the right of the state to promul-
gate reasonable regulations, the parental right recognized by Meyer is a
limited one. Although this doctrine has been discarded,36 the parental and
state rights recognized by Meyer have been consistently reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court.37
Parents may find that individual rights conflict with various aspects of
the state right to compel education. The most visible manifestation of the
state police power in education is the compulsory school attendance stat-
ute. In Wisconsin v. Yoder"5 members of the Amish religion challenged a
compulsory education statute requiring formal high school education.3 9
The parents claimed compliance with this statute after the eighth grade
would endanger or destroy the free exercise of their religious beliefs since
the imposition of worldly values was inimical to their teachings of salva-
tion.4" Although acknowledging the general validity of the compulsory edu-
cation statute, the Supreme Court held that its application to the Amish
resulted in an unconstitutional impingement upon their religious beliefs."
Furthermore, the Court held that the Amish had demonstrated the ade-
quacy of their alternative mode of informal vocational education, since the
Amish education enabled them to function effectively in both their own
community and contemporary society.2 The court noted that the Amish
were capable of fulfilling the social and political responsibilities of citizen-
ship. 3 Since these were precisely the interests advanced by the state to
the competency of the state to effect." Id. at 399-400; see Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534-35 (1925).
11 The doctrine of substantive due process entitled the Supreme Court to weigh the
wisdom of legislation. See Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952).
Thus, the legislative determination of a proper exercise of police power is neither final nor
conclusive. Instead, the police power is subject to the supervision of the courts. Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 400.
u See Day-Brite Lighting v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952). The justifications for the
substantive due process doctrine became less imperative when the Bill of Rights became
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court stated it
would no longer allow the invocation of the doctrine to be used as a bootstrap means to thrust
a court as a "super-legislature" into debates on issues concerning the public welfare. Id.; see
McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial,
1962 Sup. CT. REv. 34. But see Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 248 (1976) (use of language
of substantive due process doctrine).
31 See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 177-78 (1976); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 213-14, 232-33 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
39 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
3' Wis. STAT. ANN. § 118.15 (West 1969).
4' 406 U.S. at 210-12.
' Id. at 219.
" Id. at 235. The Amish children in Yoder completed public schooling through the eighth
grade. Id. at 210. The parents refused to permit their children to attend the additional one
or two years of formal high school necessary to comply with the age limit of the compulsory
attendance statute. Id. at 207, 210-11.
13 Id. at 225.
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justify the age requirement of compulsory education,44 the state had the
burden of demonstrating an interest of sufficient magnitude to defeat a
claim for exemption.45 The state was unable to meet this burden.46
The reasoning of the Yoder decision raises questions about the extent
of state power to require formal high school education through compulsory
education statutes. Traditionally, compulsory education has been viewed
as a means to foster cultural unity and good citizenship essential to the
stability of the state." Yet, the Yoder decision illustrates that in certain
instances the state will be unable to show its interests paramount to the
values of a small sectarian group. Once preparation for a life independent
of the mainstream of American society becomes a permissible end of edu-
cation, the state interest in compulsory education seemingly disappears.4 8
This result is further indicated by the Yoder court's refusal to accept the
state's argument that as parens patriae it was empowered to extend the
benefits of secondary education to children regardless of their parents'
wishes.49 In reaching its result the Yoder court distinguished the state's
right to correct specific identifiable parental abuses of children from the
familial role of socializing the children. ° Under the singular facts of the
Yoder case, the Court chose to strengthen parental authority.5 By the use
41 See note 16 supra. %
406 U.S. at 214. The Supreme Court's adoption of the balancing process weighing the
state's interest in universal education against personal rights was a distinct break with prior
judicial analysis. The Court previously had held activities of individuals, even when reli-
giously based, to be subject to regulation by the state as parens patriae. See, e.g., Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). In Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Court rejected constitutional distinctions between
belief and action when claims of conduct protected by the free exercise clause of the first
amendment were alleged to challenge state regulation. Id. at 402-03; see 406 U.S. at 220.
Thus, the state's interest in universal compulsory education is not absolute to the exclusion
of all other interests. Id. at 215, citing Sherbert v. Verner.
11 Id. at 235-36.
4 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); State v. Jackson, 71 N.H. 552, 53
A. 1021 (1902); note 16 supra.
41 406 U.S. at 222. Although compulsory education beyond the eighth grade may be
necessary when the child is to be prepared for life in modem society, the Court questioned
the necessity of further education when the goal of education was preparation for life in a
separated agrarian community. Id.; see Freedom and Public Education, supra note 2, at 530.
11 See text accompanying notes 42-44 supra. Compulsory attendance statutes were pro-
mulgated initially to protect the child from the evils of child labor. The laws incorporated
the premise that it was the natural duty of the parent to educate the child. Woltz,
Compulsory Attendance of School, 20 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 20 (1955). With the in-
creased recognition of the necessity of education to both the child and society, the state courts
upheld the compulsory attendance statutes on the grounds that the parents had no right to
deprive their children of the "blessings of education." See Commonwealth ex rel. School Dist.
of Pittsburgh v. Bey, 166 Pa. Super. 136, 140, 70 A.2d 693, 695 (1950); People v. Levisen, 404
Ill. 574, 577, 90 N.E.2d 213, 215 (1950); Parr v. State, 117 Ohio St. 23, _, 157 N.E. 555,
556 (1927).
0 406 U.S. at 229-30. The correction of child abuse is a justified use of state police power.
However, the role of the family as the primary agency in the socialization process was usurped
by the state through compulsory attendance statutes. See Riga, Yoder and Free Exercise, 6
J. LAW & EDUC. 449, 469 (1977).
51 See Moskowitz, Parental Rights and State Education, 50 WASH. L. Rav. 623, 628-30
1979]
284 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
of sweeping language the Court implicitly qualified the notion that educa-
tion is the business of the state by undercutting the justifications for statu-
tory restrictions on common law parental rights.
Despite the arguable rejuvenation in Yoder of common law parental
rights, the decision has had little impact upon the application of state
compulsory education laws. The ambiguity of the balancing test estab-
lished by the Court allows lower courts flexibility in interpreting the stan-
dard of review.12 The traditional standard of review of state regulation
"requires only that the State's system be shown to bear some rational
relationship to legitimate state purposes. 53 Where a state statute or edu-
cational practice impinges upon a fundamental right, the state must show
a compelling and legitimate interest which necessitates continued enforce-
ment of the statute or regulation. 4 Although the Yoder Court arguably
used the compelling interest standard, a balancing test weighing state
interests with individual claims may be interpreted to be a distinct stan-
dard of review." This ambiguity in the Yoder decision allows a court, if it
chooses to protect the state's pluralistic interests in education, to shift the
burden of persuasion to the parents, even though their claim alleged
abridgment of fundamental rights. "
The Yoder Court focused upon the legitimacy of the free exercise claims
raised by the Amish in view of the alternative education offered by the
sect.57 The Court pointed out that philosophical values or personal choice
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Moskowitz].
52 See Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395, 399 (D.N.H. 1974). But see State v. Whisner, 47
Ohio St. 2d 181, 217 n.17, 351 N.E.2d 750, 771 n.17 (1976).
Scoma v. Chicago Board of Educ., 391 F. Supp. 452, 462 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Baker v.
Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C.), affl'd, 423 U.S. 907 (1975). The plaintiff in Baker alleged
that the administration of corporal punishment over her objections violated her parental right
to guide the upbringing of her child. Id. at 295. Noting the failure of the Supreme Court to
recognize parental rights as fundamental, the district court ruled that the state did not need
to show a countervailing state interest which outweighed the plaintiff's rights. Id. at 296. The
parental rights protected by Meyer and Pierce would prevail only when the state's action was
arbitrary and without reasonable relation to an end legitimately within state power. Id. at
299.
11 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634-
38 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-09 (1963).
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1972). But see Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp.
395, 399-400 (D.N.H. 1974).
11 See Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395 (D.N.H. 1974); Education and the Law, supra
note 27, at 1395.
11 406 U.S. at 219, 235. Amish existence for three centuries as an identifiable religious
sect supported the parents' free exercise claim. Id. at 235. Moreover, the informal vocational
education provided by the Amish in lieu of one or two years of high school education suffi-
ciently addressed the interests of the state. Id. Justice White noted that a very different case
would exist if the religious claim forbade the children either from attending school or comply-
ing with state education standards. Id. at 238 (White, J., concurring).
The Yoder majority commented that the convincing showing of the Amish of a satisfac-
tory alternative education was one that few other religious groups or sects could make. Id. at
235; see, e.g., Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395 (D.N.H. 1974). Applying the Yoder rationale,
the district court in Davis refused to exempt students from certain courses despite the par-
ents' claim that the method of teaching infringed upon their free exercise of religion. Id. at
[Vol. XXXVI
PARENTAL RIGHTS
based upon purely secular considerations are not entitled to constitutional
protection." A claim that parents have the right to educate their children
"as they see fit" and "in accordance with their determination of what best
serves the family's interest and welfare" is not entitled to protection as a
claim of a fundamental constitutional right. 9 When confronted with a-non-
fundamental claim the state must only demonstrate that its requirements
are reasonable in order to establish the validity of the application of its
compulsory education law."0 If the parents successfully establish a free
exercise claim they also must show that they provide an alternative educa-
tion which is equivalent to public schooling." If the parents fail to prove
an adequate alternative, the courts should assume in light of Yoder that
the state interest in education is of sufficient magnitude to override an
infringement of a parent's fundamental right.
Although the state may regulate non-public schools, it cannot pre-empt
the parent's constitutionally protected choice of educational alternatives.
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters" the Supreme Court held that a state cannot
require every parent to send his child to a public school.13 The state's
interest in secular education may be satisfied by private educational ef-
forts.6 Nevertheless, because the state has an interest in the manner in
which public and non-public schools perform the secular education func-
tions,65 Pierce does not entitle the parents to substitute their views of the
406. The court distinguished Yoder on the basis that the children in Davis were elementary
school students, and because there was no evidence that the children were being prepared
by their parents for an existence in an isolated and independent community. Id. at 398, 400.
But see State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976); text accompanying notes
72-86 infra.
"8 406 U.S. at 215-16. The subjective evaluation and rejection of contemporary secular
values would not create a claim resting on a religious basis. "tTlhe very concept of ordered
liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in
which society as a whole has important interests." Id.; see, e.g., Matter of McMillan, 30 N.C.
App. 235, 226 S.E.2d 693 (1976) (deep rooted conviction for Indian heritage not on equal
constitutional plane with religious beliefs and thus not protected by the first amendment).
11 See Scoma v. Chicago Board of Educ., 391 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Ill. 1974). In Scoma,
the parents filed a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) seeking to enjoin the school board from
interfering with the parents' decision to educate their children at home. Id. at 455. The Scoma
court incorrectly reasoned that parental rights under Yoder did not rise above a personal or
philosophical choice. See id. at 461. The court correctly concluded, however, that the right
to guide the child's education was not a fundamental right and, therefore, the parents were
not entitled to the first amendment protection which had been accorded to the Amish in
Yoder. Id. at 461-62.
" See, e.g., 391 F. Supp. at 461. Except in situations where free exercise claims are
invoked, a court's conclusions based upon a Yoder analysis are identical to results provided
by the "reasonableness" standard of personal substantive due process as applied by the
Scoma court. See id.
11 See 406 U.S. at 213, 235. Yoder requires an alternative education which fulfills the
requirements of the state educational interests in order to be exempt from state compulsory
high school education. See text accompanying notes 96-98 infra.
a 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
13 Id. at 534-35; see text accompanying notes 29-37 supra.
, See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 247 (1968).
See id. The state has the power to insist that compliance with state compulsory
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welfare interest of society for the educational requirements of the state. "6
If the state requirements are met, the state may not restrict the liberty of
non-public schools to teach whatever values or subject matter they wish. 7
Essentially, the state cannot diminish the attractiveness of an alternative
educational process."8
State supervision and control over non-public education cannot go be-
yond "mere regulation."69 Accordingly, public officials do not have the
right to give affirmative directions "concerning the intimate and essential
details" of private schools either in the school's management or in the
parents' and schools' reasonable choice of teachers, curriculum and text-
books.7" In determining whether the state has gone beyond "mere regula-
tion," the standard of review is whether the regulations are "arbitrary,
attendance laws include attendance at institutions which provide minimum hours of instruc-
tion, employ teachers with specified training, and cover prescribed subjects of instruction.
Id. at 245-46; accord, West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631 (1943)
(state may require certain courses of instruction).
" Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 239 (1972) (White, J., concurring). The defendants
in Pierce, a private parochial school and military academy, were in complete compliance with
the education standards set by the state. 268 U.S. at 533. Therefore, the state's power to
promulgate education standards was not challenged. Id. at 534. The Court's inquiry focused
on the reasonableness of the compulsory attendance statute. Id.; see text accompanying notes
33-37 supra.
17 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 177 (1976).
$ See id., School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). The parents in
Schempp objected to a Pennsylvania law requiring school classes to begin each day with
readings from the Bible. Id. at 205. Although individual students were excused upon parental
request, the Supreme Court ruled that the lack of coercion did not furnish a defense to a claim
of violation of the establishment clause of the first amendment. Id. at 224-25. The state
cannot jeopardize the freedom of the public schools from private or sectarian pressures, nor
may the state restrict the liberty of private schools to inculcate whatever values they wish.
Either circumstance would inhibit the parent's freedom to choose the schooling for his child.
Id. at 242 (Brennan. J., concurring). In Runyon, the school's right to inculcate racially dis-
criminatory beliefs was not challenged. 427 U.S. at 177. Schools remain presumptively free,
the Court declared, to teach whatever values and standards they deem desirable. Id. But see
note 25 supra.
The state legislature, however, may require subjects of instruction which private school
authorities or parent patrons believe unnecessary or harmful. Further, the legislature may
require the schools to utilize methods of instruction which are contrary to a non-public
school's particular educational philosophy. Private Schools, supra note 25, at 754.
11 Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298 (1927). Farrington, Meyer, Pierce and
Yoder are the only decisions of the Supreme Court which have directly confronted parental
claims to the freedom of private schooling. Although the Court in Farrington, Meyer and
Pierce relied upon a substantive due process rationale, the cases remain the principal deci-
sions which establish constitutional limits on state control of private education. See text
accompanying notes 29-37 supra. In Farrington, parents challenged Hawaii laws regulating
private foreign language schools. 273 U.S. at 290. Although the children attended public
schools in compliance with the compulsory attendance law, the state completely regulated
the hours, curriculum, textbooks, and qualifications of pupils and teachers, necessary for the
private schools to obtain operating permits. Id. at 291-96. Enforcement of these laws, the
Supreme Court ruled, deprived the parents of the right to procure instruction for their chil-




discriminatory, oppressive and otherwise unreasonable."'
Minimum state standards for private schools prescribed by the Ohio
State Board of Education were recently challenged in State v. Whisner."
In Whisner, defendants, a "born-again" religious school, alleged that the
application of Ohio's compulsory attendance laws 3 to enforce the state
board regulations7 infringed upon the defendants' free exercise of reli-
gion. 5 .The Ohio Supreme Court declared that the minimum standards
effectively "obliterated" the parochial school's philosophy and imposed
the philosophy of the state." In interpreting the Federal constitution, the
court held that since the school and the parents had demonstrated that
their religious beliefs had been infringed, the "minimum standards" were
unconstitutional." The court also noted that the all-pervasive nature of the
regulations furnished an additional, independent ground for upholding the
defendants' constitutional challenge. ' The state was unable to establish
an interest of sufficient .magnitude overriding the free exercise claims of
the school and the parents.
79
The Whisner court reasoned that the state's interest in a general educa-
tion of high quality could be achieved by means other than the comprehen-
sive regulation of all educational efforts." Although relying on Wisconsin
"1 See text accompanying notes 29-37 supra; see, e.g., State v. Williams, 253 N.C. 337,
117 S.E.2d 444 (1960) (state regulation of solicitors for private business school cannot unrea-
sonably interfere with their personal liberty).
" 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976).
" Omo Rav. CoDE ANN. § 3321.03 (Page 1972) provides that the parent "shall cause such
child to attend a school which conforms to the minimum standards prescribed by the state
board of education . .. ."
" Otno Rav. CODE ANN. § 3301.07(D) (Page 1972) provides that the state board of educa-
tion "shall formulate and prescribe minimum standards to be applied to all elementary and
high schools in this state for the purpose of requiring a general education of high quality."
7' 47 Ohio St. 2d at 200-11, 351 N.E.2d at 762-67. The parents and the school'in Whisner
objected to four of the state's "minimum standards" set forth in Minimum Standards for
Ohio Elementary Schools (Rev. 1970). The defendants complained that the minimum in-
structional time allocation failed to allot time for religious training and was, therefore, inimi-
cal to the fundamental purpose of a religious school. The defendants also viewed the required
conformance to board of education policies as providing public authorities with a blank check
to control the school operation. Finally, the religious school would only provide quality educa-
tion by seeking direction from the defendants' own values, not through required cooperation
and interaction with the community. As a result, the defendants refused to obtain a charter
because acceptance would constitute an agreement to comply with all the standards. Id. at
201-02, 351 N.E.2d at 762-63.
,' Id. at 215-16, 351 N.E.2d at 770.
7 Id. at 211, 351 N.E.2d at 767.
'7 Id. at 211-18, 351 N.E.2d at 768-71.
7' Id. at 215-18, 351 N.E.2d at 770-71. The combination of parental interests with a free
exercise claim meant that the state needed to demonstrate an interest of sufficient magnitude
to override the defendants' claims. The Ohio Supreme Court reasoned that the Yoder Court
did not intend to depart from a test of "compelling state interest" as the proper standard of
review to determine'wlether the statute could be sustained. Id. at 217 n.17, 351 .N.E.2d at
771 n.17.
"Id. at 216-17, 351 N.E.2d at 771.
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v. Yoder,"' the court failed to determine whether the defendants' religious
faith and mode of life were "inseparable and independent." 2 The Yoder
Court regarded this determination as indicative of whether the defendants'
claim was merely a matter of personal preference, or one of deep religious
conviction intimately related to daily living." Furthermore, the Whisner
court did not articulate why the defendants' concept of education could be
substituted for the state's policies.84 Instead, the court placed the burden
on the state to demonstrate the lack of alternatives to serve the state's
educational interests. 5 Although free exercise of religion is a fundamental
constitutional right, the right to guide a child's education is not.88 The
Whisner court's rigid application of the compelling interest standard of
review precluded the court's consideration of the balancing factors re-
quired by Yoder. Typically, the state interest in elementary education is
accorded greater weight than the Whisner court granted in applying the
Yoder decision. Since the Ohio court greatly extended the Yoder rationale
in protecting the parents' rights, the Whisner opinion may not offer an
accurate indication of the Federal constitutional limits of state regulation
of private education.
Non-public schools presumptively remain free to experiment and disa-
gree with values and standards taught in the public schools.8 Non-public
education, nevertheless, must serve the public interest.u Although the
most effective means of satisfying the state's responsibility for education
is a state supported and operated educational system,8 the states rarely
impose unreasonable regulation on non-public schools.80 Typically, com-
pulsory education statutes are used to enforce compliance with various
state requirements.8 The statutes either specifically authorize attendence
" 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see text accompanying notes 38-61 supra.
52 The court did not inquire into the religious nature of the defendants' beliefs. See Note,
State v. Whisner, 37 OHIO ST. L. J. 899, 903-06 (1976).
406 U.S. at 215-16.
' In contrast to the Amish in Yoder, the defendants in Whisner made no showing that
the goal of the private education was to prepare their children for life in a separated and
isolated community. See id. at 222. Moreover, the Amish children had completed eight grades
of compulsory state education. The state interest in providing children with the basic tools
of literacy at the elementary level may be of sufficient magnitude to override any impinge-
ment of constitutional rights. See id. at 237-41 (White, J., concurring).
'4 47 Ohio St. 2d at 216-18, 351 N.E.2d at 771.
' See text accompanying notes 20-28 supra.
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 177 (1976).
0 . KRAUSHAUR, AMERICAN NON-PUBLIC SCHOOLS: PATTERNS OF DivERsrrv 315 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as KRAUSHAUR]; see text accompanying notes 9-19 supra.
' See T. GEEL, AUTHORITY TO CONTROL THE SCHOOL PROGRAM 8-11, 153 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as GEEL]. But see P. GOODMAN, COMPULSORY MISEDUCATION (1964); Moskowitz, supra
note 51, at 635-36.
KRAUSHAUR, supra note 88, at 314.
' GEEL, supra note 89, at 153-65. The states may use several methods to enforce regula-
tion of private schools. If the school must register, the state can either force compliance by
the private school or the state may prosecute parents who send their children to non-approved
schools. However, if the compulsory education statute does not require equivalence between
the public and non-public schools the state will have difficulty demonstrating a statutory
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at private schools or require that alternative education be equivalent to the
academic programs offered in the public schools.2 Moreover, several states
require private schools to obtain prior certification from the state board of
education before the children attending the school will be deemed to be in
compliance with the compulsory attendance statute. 3 These varied statu-
tory schemes are applied by the local boards of education which are respon-
sible for the daily operations of the schools within their districts. 4 Local
attitudes often determine the effectiveness of state policies and require-
ments." As a result, state regulation ranges from almost total control to
minimal involvement in the private educational process.
Home instruction is an alternative private educational effort to organ-
ized public education. Although Pierce provides parents with a constitu-
tionally protected opportunity to seek a reasonable alternative to public
education, home instruction has not been afforded such protection. Proper
exercise of the broad parental powers seemingly revived by Yoder may
fulfill the traditional state interests which have been advanced to prohibit
home education. If the state interest is limited to adequate instruction of
the children, the facilities provided should be of no consequence. 6 Most
violation by the parents.
If the schools need not register, the state can only control the schools indirectly by
prosecuting parents for violating the compulsory education statutes. However, if there are no
required standards of equivalence the state may not be able to prosecute at all, and, as a
result, the control of private education is nearly impossible. Id. at 154-55 (table of state
statutes).
12 E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1502 (1960) ("shall send such child to a public, private, or
parochial school"); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 20 § 911(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1978) (compulsory
attendance in public school excused if student obtains equivalent instruction in private
school).
3 E.g., R.I. GEN. LAws § 16-19-2 (1970); S.C. CODE § 59-65-10 (1977). See United States
Reading Lab., Inc. v. Brockette, 551 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (requirement of
certificate of approval is reasonable exercise of legislative power). But see State v. LaBarge,
134 Vt. 276, 357 A.2d 121 (1976). In LaBarge, the children were attending a private school
not yet approved under state law. The Vermont Supreme Court declared that the term
"equivalent education" was a distinct concept from school approval. Under Vermont law
approval may be denied for reasons unrelated to equivalency (e.g. financial capacity or lack
of special services). Id. at----, 357 A.2d at 125; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16 § 166 (1974). The court,
therefore, upheld the lower court's dismissal of the case because the department of education
had made no determination of equivalency. 134 Vt. at _, 357 A.2d at 123.
" R. CAMPBELL, L. CUNNINGHAM & R. McPHE., THE ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL OF AMERI-
CAN SCHOOLS 54-59 (1965). The state legislature usually considers only basic policy questions.
The state board of education establishes standards within the legislative guidelines. In recog-
nition of local autonomy, the states delegate control over actual operation to the district
school boards. The local boards must observe state minimums (e.g. courses, hours of instruc-
tion). Id. at 53-70.
," Members of the school board are subject to varying pressures when deciding important
educational matters. See R. BENDINER, THE PoLITIcs OF SCHOOLS 36-39 (1969); Gross, Who
Controls the Schools?, EDUCATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 25-26 (1964). As a result, significant local
diversity can be maintained within the state's uniform educational system. CONANT, supra
note 2, at 15-16. As a further consequence of this diversity, private school supervision often
is not extensive. See generally KRAUSHAUR, supra note 88, at 314; D. ERIKSON, ed., PUBLIC
CONTROLS FOR NON-PuBLIC SCHOOLS (1969).
" The Yoder decision may be read to protect broad parental powers which may be
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states, however, continue to view socialization of the child as a fundamen-
tal function of formal educational institutions.9" Neither Pierce nor Yoder
disputed the state's interest in institutionalized education." If Yoder is
applicable to the parents' right to home instruction, the compelling inter-
est of the state in socialization would still permit the state to establish
reasonable regulations which could effectively foreclose this alternative
mode of education. Thus, the question of whether home instruction is a
reasonable alternative has been left to the state legislatures.
Most states require that compulsory education be satisfied by regular
attendance at an organized institution." Although a compulsory atten-
dance statute may not specifically authorize home instruction or private
tutoring, the statute may entitle the parent to provide equivalent educa-
tion.00 Non-institutional instruction must be "equal in value to that given
in the public school."'' ° The determination of the standards necessary to
achieve equivalence has been left to the courts. A showing of compliance
with all the state education requirements is generally sufficient. In several
states, however, despite such compliance, the courts have not allowed
home instruction unless local school board authorities have granted prior
restricted only in certain circumstances. See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra. The state
could measure the progress of children in the basic subjects by use of standardized tests.
Therefore, the only state interest entitled to constitutional sanction might be in adequate
education, not institutional instruction. See Moskowitz, supra note 51, at 630-36.
'1 Education and the Law, supra note 27, at 1397-98. But see State v. Massa, 95 N.J.
Super. 382, 387-90, 231 A.2d 252, 255-57 (1967).
" See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213, 235. The parents in Yoder did not challenge
the state's right to compel formal education through the eighth grade in a state approved
school. The Court held only that the Amish had established the adequacy of their mode of
alternative education in comparison to the state interests in the last two years of formal
education. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
"1 In several states the school must be an institution "consisting of a teacher and pupils
• ..gathered together for instruction in any branch of learning." State ex rel. Shoreline
School Dist. No. 412 v. Superior Court, 55 Wash. 2d 117, -, 346 P.2d 999, 1002, cert.
denied, 363 U.S. 814 (1960). The guidelines for determination of a qualified private school,
the Washington Supreme Court stated, are established by the minimum standards set by
the legislature for the public common schools. Id. at -, 346 P.2d at 1003. See, e.g., State
v. Counort, 69 Wash. 361, 363-64, 124 P. 910, 911-12 (1912) (school is "regular, organized and
existing institution" making business of instructing in required studies full time); State v.
Garber, 197 Kan. 567, -, 419 P.2d 896, 900 (1966); In Re Davis, 114 N.H. 242, -, 318
A.2d 151, 152 (1974).
Other states do not limit adequate educational instruction to an institutional setting.
See, e.g., State v. Peterman, 32 Ind. App. 665,_ , 70 N.E. 550, 551-52 (1904). The Peterman
court held instruction by a private tutor, if equal to education in the public schools, to
constitute compliance with the compulsory education statute. "[Tihe number of persons,
whether one or many," does not "make a place where instruction is imparted any less or more
a school." Id. at -, 770 N.E. at 551; accord, People v. Turner, 277 App. Div. 2d 317, 319,
98 N.Y.S.2d 886, 888 (1950) (object of compulsory education law is to see that children receive
instruction from some source); People v. Levisen, 404 Ill. 574, -, 90 N.E.2d 213, 215-16
(1950) (home education meeting all statutory requirements is "private school").
11 E.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 299.1 (West Cum. Supp. 1978) (equivalent instruction in lieu
of attendance at public school).
I Stephens v. Bongart, 15 N.J. Misc. 80, -, 189 A. 131, 134 (1937).
[Vol. XXXVI
PARENTAL RIGHTS
approval,'12 or unless parents have provided a certified tutor.'0 If the court
determines that "equivalent" refers to equivalence of social development
as well as academic equivalency, the child can only be educated in a group
which would constitute a de facto school.' 4 The viability of home educa-
tion remains dependent upon the educational philosophy of the state
courts and the attitudes of the community as reflected in the local school
boards which must enforce the truancy statutes.
When the state charges a parent with violation of the compulsory edu-
cation statutes, the parent must introduce evidence showing that an equiv-
alent, alternative education has been substituted for organized educa-
tion.' 5 The court initially will examine the parents' ability to provide
equivalent instruction.' 0 The courts generally require the quality, charac-
ter and methods of teaching provided by the parents to be comparable to
that offered by the local school district.'1 In In Re Franz'0 a mother dem-
onstrated that she was competent to teach her child although she did not
have formal qualification. 9 The New York Family Court ruled, however,
that one and one-half hours of instruction per day in a formal setting was
not sufficient to satisfy the minimal hours of instruction required by the
state.10 The court found further support for this result in the parents'
failure to establish a systematic plan of instruction encompassing the
courses of study required by the state.' In evaluating home instruction,
the courts consider the number of hours of instruction, the regularity of
instruction, the nature of the materials used and the methods used to
determine academic achievement.1
2
102 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Renfrew, 332 Mass. 492, 126 N.E.2d 109 (1955); Rice v.
Commonwealth, 188 Va. 224, 49 S.E.2d 342 (1948).
203 See, e.g., In Re Shinn, 195 Cal. App. 2d 683, 16 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1961); F&F v. Duval
County, 273 So.2d 15 (Fla. App. 1973).
'I" See State v. Massa, 95 N.J. Super. 382, 387, 231 A.2d 252, 255 (1967). In Massa, the
parents were charged with failure to provide their child with an equivalent education by
educating the child at home. The New Jersey court rejected the argument that a certain
number of students must be present in order to attain an equivalent education. The purpose
of the compulsory education statute was not to require that children be educated in a particu-
lar way. Id. at 389-90, 231 A.2d at 256. The parents need show no more than equivalent
academic instruction in their teaching program when compared to the education provided
by the local public school system. Id. at 390-91, 231 A.2d at 257.
' E.g., id. at 386, 231 A.2d at 254.
'" E.g., Stephens v. Bongart, 15 N.J. Misc. 80, _, 189 A. 131, 134 (1937).
" Id.
lO 84 Misc. 2d 914, 378 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1976), affl'd, 55 App. Div. 2d 424, 390 N.Y.S.2d
940 (1977).
'" Id. at 917-18, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
" Id. at 920-22, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 323-25; see N.Y. Enuc. LAw § 3210(2) (McKinney
1970).
M 84 Misc. 2d at 920-21, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 323-24. The standard of instruction and the
subject matter to be taught must conform to the standards imposed by the school board in
order to establish the qquivalency of education. Id. at 916, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 320; see N.Y.
EDuc. LAw §§ 3204(2) (instruction by competent teacher), 3204(3)(a)(1) (required courses of
study), 3210(2) (hours of instruction) (McKinney 1970).
H Courts in New Jersey and New York have recently decided cases involving the stan-
dards of equivalence which must be met by parents choosing to educate their child at home.
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Whether or not the child attends a public school or non-public school,
the state retains the power to impose minimal, uniform curriculum re-
quirements. Meyer v. Nebraska"' limits state authority over the curricu-
lum by requiring state prohibition of courses of study to have a rational
basis. Although the Meyer decision demonstrates that state control over
the curriculum is not absolute, the opinion establishes no further guide-
lines.'" The indefiniteness caused by the lack of constitutional parameters
is magnified by the reluctance of federal and state courts to decide claims
which they consider to exclusively concern issues of educational exper-
tise." ''
The states traditionally were entitled to require that studies plainly
essential to "good citizenship" be taught to every child."' Generally, how-
ever, the common law courts protected the values of the parents. Thus, if
a court determined that a course did not satisfy this flexible standard, the
parents had the right to select what their child should learn."' 7 When
parental values which were not inimical to the interests of citizenship
clashed with a prescribed course, the child was granted an excusal from
the class."' 8 The parents did not have the right, however, to have their
Although neither New Jersey nor New York requires that the parents hold teaching certifi-
cates, the threshold determination of the court is whether the parent is competent to teach
in the subjects required by the state. See, e.g., State v. Massa, 95 N.J. Super. 382, 231 A.2d
252 (1967); Stephens v. Bongart, 15 N.J. Misc. 80, 189 A. 131 (1937); In Re Franz, 84 Misc.
2d 914, 378 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1976); In Re H, 78 Misc. 2d 412, 357 N.Y.S.2d 384 (1974).
Difficulty arises, however, because the burden of proof of compliance or non-compliance
with the state compulsory education law varies among the states. See, e.g., State v. Massa,
95 N.J. Super. at 386, 231 A.2d at 254-55. In New Jersey, violation of the compulsory educa-
tion statute is a quasi-criminal offense, and a violator is subject to a fine. N.J. STAT. ANN. §
18A:38-31 (West 1968). The state must establish its burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. But see In Re Franz, 84 Misc. 2d at 915-16, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 319-20. In New York,
provisions of the education act apply under the child neglect laws, N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT §
1012(f)(i)(A) (McKinney 1975). Therefore, the burden of proof lies with the parent at a
neglect proeeeding. However, the use of child neglect statutes to pursue non-attendance in
school may not be appropriate when the parents' provision of equivalent education is at issue.
See In Re Davis, 114 N.H. 242, -, 318 A.2d 151, 152 (1974).
13 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
"4 See text accompanying notes 29-36 supra.
,5 See text accompanying notes 128-33 infra.
"' See text accompanying notes 6-9 supra.
" E.g., State ex rel. Kelley v. Ferguson, 95 Neb. 63, 144 N.W. 1039 (1914). The common
law courts granted broad parental control in the choices of studies for the child because the
parents were supposed to have a more substantial interest in their child's welfare than the
mere temporary interest of the school. Compulsory education statutes signified the states'
recognition that the parent's interest was not always aligned with the child's. See note 49
supra.
' E.g., Hardwick v. Board of School Trustees, 54 Cal. App. 696, 205 P. 49 (1921). The
Hardwick court determined that the parent's wishes for excusal of his child would not inter-
fere with the established school discipline. Id. at -, 205 P. at 54. Judicially or legislatively
created exemptions do not create enormous administrative difficulties. The demand for provi-
sion of courses not available in the school program, however, creates enormous administrative
problems. See, e.g., Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395 (D.N.H. 1974). But see MAss. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 71 § 13 (West Cum. Supp. 1978) (parent's right to petition for curricular additions).
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children receive instruction in areas of study other than the offered courses
of the school." 9 Common law parental rights have weakened with the dec-
line of the substantive due process doctrine and the increasing educational
demands of an advanced industrial society.2 0 Despite the proliferation of
minimum curriculum requirements the courts have become increasingly
reluctant to exempt students from required courses that are taught within
constitutional limits.'
2'
The methodological requirements of the curriculum serve the state's
interest in fulfilling its own educational goals through efficient and effec-
tive instruction. The methods of instruction often create conflicts between
parental and state interests similar to those raised by required courses of
study. In Davis v. Page' the parentsobjected to the school board's refusal
to allow their children to withdraw from courses employing audio-visual
equipment. The parents, who were Apostolic Lutherans, contended that
the exposure to audio-visual aids was contrary to their religious teachings.
The parents urged that the school board's refusal to excuse their children
from such classes abridged their right to raise their children according to
the dictates of their religion.2n After determining that the use of audio-
visual equipment was an integral part of the educational process, the dis-
trict court upheld the refusal to allow the children to withdraw.' 2 The
court did not regard the provision of a separate course which did not use
audio-visual equipment as an acceptable alternative. This opinion illus-
trates that often the state interest in maintaining a coherent and compre-
hensive education program surpasses parental interests.1n
"I E.g., State ex rel Sheibley v. School Dist. No. 1, 31 Neb. 552, 48 N.W. 393 (1891). In
Sheibley, the Nebraska Supreme Court noted the necessity for efficiency in school operations.
Id. at _, 48 N.W. at 394. Under Sheibley, the parent does not have the right to require
sacrifice of other children's interests for the sake of his own child's interests. Id. Thus, the
parent could not demand that his child receive methods of study distinct from those adopted
by the school board. See, e.g., Samuel Benedict Memorial School v. Bradford, 111 Ga. 801,
36 S.E. 920 (1900) (question of whether particular subject is suited to age of pupil is question
for determination by school authorities).
'2 See note 2 supra.
"I See, e.g., Vaughn v. Reed, 313 F. Supp. 431 (W.D. Va. 1970). The district court
declared that once the school board determines that a particular course is necessary for the
education of one child, the course is necessary to the education of all students. Id. at 433.
The Vaughn court, therefore, refused to grant a requested course exemption. Id. at 434.
" 385 F. Supp. 395 (D.N.H. 1974).
' Id. at 397-98. The parents in Davis also claimed that mandatory health and music
courses infringed upon their right of free exercise of religion. The district court held, however,
that the parents had failed to demonstrate a constitutionally significant burden on their free
exercise of religion because they could not establish specific tenets which would be violated
by the children's attendance at these classes. Id. at 405.
12M Id. at 399-401. Rather than requiring a showing of compelling state interest, the
district court stated that the balancing test of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214-15, should
be applied. 385 F. Supp. at 399. The court pointed out, however, that the situation was not
comparable to Yoder because the children were elementary school students and the parents
were not preparing the children for an existence in an isolated and independent community.
Id. at 400.
121 385 F. Supp. at 404-06.
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The Davis and Whisner decisions highlight the ambiguity of the bal-
ancing test established by the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder.' 6
Yoder and Whisner protected the parent's right to mold his child's beliefs.
The Davis court, however, aligned the state's interest with the child's in
opposition to parental interests. This traditional view of the state's parens
patriae role in education meant that the pluralistic values of community
education would be of sufficient magnitude to override the parents' claim
for exemptions. Except in limited circumstances involving first amend-
ment rights, exemption from a course does not provide an automatic solu-
tion to the clash between individual values of the parent and the pluralistic
values of the community. The courts are reluctant to create special curric-
ulum exemptions to remedy a particular encroachment upon an individ-
ual's rights. 127 The need for an efficient public school system often serves
as a compelling interest.
As indicated by recent decisions, parents are no longer considered to
be the primary judges of their child's educational interests.'- As a result,
judicial deference to school board expertise will continue even in the face
of a constitutional claim.'2 Federal and state courts are reluctant to inter-
vene in debates over issues of educational policy because the courts possess
no marked or controlling competence in the field.' Matters solely within
the administrative expertise of education officials are not judicially cogniz-
able.'"' If no fundamental rights are infringed by an educational program,
the court's inquiry will be limited to whether the school board has acted
in a reasonable exercise of its power and discretion. 2 Safeguarding of
In See text accompanying notes 52-56 supra.
1" 385 F. Supp. at 404-06. The Davis court emphasized the general needs of a system of
education over a policy which allowed parents and children to "pick and choose" which
courses they wanted to attend. The court feared this would result in a stratified and chaotic
school structure. Id. at 405; accord, Mitchell v. McCall, 273 Ala. 604, -, 143 So.2d 629,
632 (1962). The plaintiffs in Davis offered no instructional alternative to satisfy the state's
overwhelming interest in elementary education. If the courts continue to insist upon protect-
ing community and state interests, the individual values protected by Yoder would only be
protected in circumstances analogous to Yoder. But see Public School Curriculum, supra note
2.
In See, e.g., Keefe v. Geankos, 418 F.2d 359, 361-62 (1st Cir. 1969); BANKS, supra note
10, at 2-3.
'2 Courts have continually reiterated that the courtroom is not the proper place for
debating issues of educational policy. See Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586,
598 (1940); President's Council v. Community School Bd., 457 F.2d 289, 292 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972). See also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); Baker
v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294, 301 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
110 Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 598 (1940).
"I In Re Baum, 86 Misc. 2d 409, 413, 382 N.Y.S.2d 672, 675 (1976), aff'd, 61 App. Div.
2d 123, 401 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1978). The parent must exhaust all avenues of administrative
appeal unless the child is exposed to a situatign which threatens his health, safety or welfare.
Id. at 413, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 675. The courts are unwilling to hinder the discretion of school
officials in deciding the methods to be used in accomplishing legitimate educational purposes
by judicially resolving disputes between the parents and the schools. See, e.g., Baker v. Owen,
395 F. Supp. 294, 301 (M.D.N.C. 1975); Rosenberg v. Board of Educ., 196 Misc. 542, 543-44,
92 N.Y.S.2d 344, 346 (1949).
12 See, e.g., Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1966). Meyer and Pierce
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academic freedom, however, remains a special first amendment concern.
The courts, therefore, tend to vigilantly protect against laws which cast a
"pall of orthodoxy" over the classroom.'
Students and teachers in the elementary and secondary levels of educa-
tion are entitled to academic freedom which is vastly circumscribed de-
spite constitutional protection.14 These schools function to transmit
knowledge considered to be essential rather than to permit academic ex-
ploration.1' The elementary and secondary schools are closely supervised
by the local boards of education which are designed to represent the preve-
lant view of the community regarding basic values, concepts and skills
necessary to integrate the -child into an industrialized society.'" Neither
the state, the community, nor the individual parent can act to "contract
the spectrum of available knowledge."'' 7 School authorities, however, are
entitled to select areas of study which will be included in the curriculum.' '3
Parental involvement in the curriculum selection process does not always
promote greater academic freedom. Often the intervention may amount to
an attempt to restrict knowledge and limit educational prerogatives.' '9
require that actions of the state and the local boards as arms of state power be reasonable.
The local boards cannot act solely in response to comrunity pressure. See, e.g., Valent v.
New Jersey State Bd. of Educ., 114N.J. Super. 63, 76-77, 274 A.2d 832, 840 (1971) (majority
sentiment of community does not show overriding government interest and necessity); Wilson
v. Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358, 1364 (D. Ore. 1976) (board must show reasonable fear of
material and substantial interference with the education process, not mere fear of voter
reaction).
"1 See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479 (1960).
'13 See, e.g., Cary v. Board of Educ. of Adams-Arapahoe School Dist., 427 F. Supp. 945,
954-55 (D. Colo. 1977). The right to academic freedom is not so clear on the high school level
as on the college level. In Cary the district court regarded its role to be limited to deciding
who has authority to choose and the extent of the constitutional limitations on the power of
the decisionmaker. The wisdom of a school board's decision was supposed to be irrelevant to
the district court's determinations. Id. at 950.
13 Academic Freedom, supra note 13, at 1050.
'3 Cary v. Board of Educ. of Adams-Arapahoe School Dist., 427 F. Supp. 945, 952 (D.
Colo. 1977); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Mass.), affl'd, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st
Cir. 1971).
I" Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
'3 See Mercer v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 379 F. Supp. 580, 586 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd,
419 U.S. 1081 (1974). Plaintiffs, a physician and teacher, challenged a state law prohibiting
discussion of birth control in public schools. In view of the unquestioned right of the state to
establish curricula, as well as the inability of public schools to offer a vast range of subjects,
the district court held that it was proper and necessary for education authorities to make
certain choices based on their expertise. Id.; see Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 110-12
(1968) (Black, J., concurring).
" See, e.g., Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo County Bd. of Educ., 51 Cal. App.
3d 1, 124 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1975). In San Mateo, the parents' organization sought to enjoin public
schools from offering a family life and sex education program. Id. at 10-11, 124 Cal. Rptr. at
77. Emphasizing the fact that the program had an excusal system for dissenting parents, the
California court rejected all of the plaintiffs' claims of impairments of their religious freedom
and parental authority. The court declared that no constitutional right gave the objectors
power to preclude other students from voluntarily participating in a course. Id. at 32, 124 Cal.
Rptr. at 91; accord, Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 340, 342-44 (D. Md. 1969),
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Nevertheless, providing education is a uniquely public function,'40 and the
interests of all members of the community must be recognized when school
board policies are challenged.'
Parental authority over local policy is limited to the rights granted by
the legislature."' Consequently, parents do not enjoy a general power to-
supervise school authorities. Massachusetts recently has established an
exception to the curriculum hegemony enjoyed by school authorities by
giving legal status to community curriculum petitions. The Massachusetts
statute requires that a course shall be taught if a minimum number of
parents of enrolled children sign a written request.4 3 By turning authority
of the school board over to the parents, however, the statute may preclude
other parties with an interest in school affairs from being heard.' The
choice of curriculum embodies values of the community and state as well
as groups whose educational interests are distinct from the parents. The
adoption of curriculum and the final decision about the modes and meth-
ods of education properly rests with the school board which can integrate
the various demands in light of local needs.4 5
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970); cf. Valent v. New Jersey State Bd. of Educ., 114 N.J. Super.
63, __, 274 A.2d 832, 839-41 (1971) (interest of state in sex education program without
excusal system must be balanced with interest of the individual). See generally K. ALEXANDER
& K. JORDAN, LEGAL AsPEcTS OF EDUCATIONAL CHOICE: COMPULSORY ATTENDANCE AND STUDENT
ASSIGNmENT (1973).
40 School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 241-42 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
" See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 631-33 (1969). In an attempt to
limit the school district participation "to those primarily interested in education," New York
limited the right to vote for members of the school board to persons owning taxable real
property or parents with children enrolled in local public schools. N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 2012
(McKinney 19_..__). The law, the Supreme Court noted, included many persons with a
remote or indirect interest in education while excluding many with distinct and direct inter-
ests. 395 U.S. at 632. The law, therefore, constituted a violation of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. However, the Court did not determine whether the state could
limit the franchise in school board elections to those who were "primarily interested" or
"principally affected." Id. at 632. In order to have standing to challenge curriculum regula-
tions the parties must be school children and their parents who are directly affected by the
laws and policies. School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 n.9 (1963). Neither
private citizens nor teachers have standing to raise the rights of students or their parents.
Mercer v. Michigan Bd. of Educ., 379 F. Supp. 580, 583-84 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
"I See New York City School Boards v. Board of Educ., 84 Misc. 2d 237, 241-42, 375
N.Y.S.2d 978, 983 (1975).
'" MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 71 § 13 (West Cum. Supp. 1978) provides:
In every public high school having not less than one hundred and fifty pupils any
course not included in the regular curriculum shall be taught if the parents or
guardians of not less than twenty pupils, or of a number of pupils equivalent to five
per cent of the enrollment in the high school, whichever is less, request in writing
the teaching thereof ....
"I GEEL, supra note 87, at 144-47; see Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621
(1969).
" See Mercer v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 379 F. Supp. 580, 585 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
The curriculum of the state may be established either by law or by delegation of state
authority to the local boards and communities. The scope of judicial intervention is limited
to ascertaining initially whether the school board has acted within its delegated powers. The
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Presently, the parent has the formal opportunity to educate his child
as he prefers.' Although parents have the choice of selecting a non-public
school providing curriculum which they deem proper, the cost of private
education is often prohibitive. The Supreme Court's prohibition of aid to
parochial schools, and the limited aid available to the parents, creates an
effective economic barrier to the exercise of this right.'47 Thus, most par-
ents are forced to accept the values inculcated in the public school system.
Despite the questions raised about the compelling nature of state interests
in education in Wisconsin v. Yoder, ' as the need for more technical knowl-
edge increases the traditional state interest in adequate education will
continue to be protected by the federal and state courts. The recourse left
to parents to affect the curriculum remains the cumbersome and often
frustrating opportunity to voice opinions at public meetings and the right
to elect the members of the school board.
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court then determines whether the action was constitutionally reasonable. See Burnside v.
Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1966).
, s See text accompanying notes 62-68 supra.
"' E.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971.).
,,I See text accompanying notes 38-61 supra.
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